Clawing for Talent: Mock Drafts and Long Term STrategy

Jalon Walker from Georgia.

Mock drafts are a lot of fun for fans, especially during the long offseason. They become even more exciting after the Super Bowl when the official draft order is set. However, they hold little value before free agency in March. A team’s needs in February might be addressed in a mock draft, only to become irrelevant after free agency.

Personally, I can spend hours on NFL mock draft simulators, but real or simulated drafts don’t take meaningful shape until after the first days of free agency. I don’t want this team to spend big in free agency, as I believe most players fail to live up to expectations after receiving large contracts. Instead, the team should target overlooked players who have slipped through the cracks in difficult situations—like Jeremy Chinn, who wasn’t utilized properly in Carolina but thrived in the right scheme after leaving.

A major problem this organization has faced is a lack of long-term strategy. Constantly shifting between philosophies—like switching from zone blocking to a power run scheme or from a three-man front to a four-man front—makes it difficult to draft players with traits that fit the system. This lack of continuity has hurt roster development and overall success.

Now that the team has settled on a scheme, they need to focus on drafting players who fit it. Free agency should be used to fill gaps, allowing them to draft strategically rather than out of necessity. This approach ensures they can truly select the best players for their system.

Move Myles?

Myles Garrett.

Myles Garrett wants to be released. He feels his time in Cleveland has run its course—one of the NFL’s wastelands, potentially worse than Carolina. Meanwhile, the Panthers desperately need stars on defense to pair with Derrick Brown and Jaycee Horn.

If the equation were as simple as trading the No. 8 pick for Garrett, would you do it? I wouldn’t—but it’s a tough call. Garrett is 29, and while that’s not old for a quarterback, it’s getting up there for a pass rusher. Yes, he would instantly be better than anyone the Panthers could draft at No. 8, but his cap hit would severely limit offseason flexibility.

Successful teams are built organically, and that’s where Carolina has struggled. Their issues stem from two major mistakes: making the wrong hires in the front office and coaching staff, and trying to force success too quickly—like believing Bryce Young could step into a winning situation in 2023.

The right move here is to pass on the generational talent. Garrett is elite and at his peak, but by the time the Panthers put the necessary pieces around him, he’ll be on the decline. Let him go to Buffalo or Baltimore, where he can push a contender over the top. In Charlotte, he would only consume resources that the organization needs to take the next step.

Risking with Rookies

Two major questions loom over the Panthers offensive line this offseason: what to do with Taylor Moton’s contract and how to find stability at center.

The Moton contract situation is particularly interesting because the team appears to be moving away from the “kick the can down the road” approach—spending now and dealing with the financial consequences later. However, with the strides Bryce Young made in the second half of the season, this is not the time to tinker with his protection. The Panthers must find a way to extend Moton and manage the cost down the line.

As for the center position, the team dropped the ball last year. There’s no need to rehash that mistake when they could have secured stability for the next decade. Heading into this season, Cade Mays seems like the logical choice, and based on his performance, fans should feel comfortable with that.

Which brings us to the draft. The Panthers must get ahead of the ball and start drafting players for the future rather than focusing solely on immediate impact. That’s not to say rookies can’t contribute, but relying on them to step into starting roles right away is not a recipe for success. Ideally, the team should select players who can develop into key contributors in years two, three, and four. That should be the strategy this year.

While they have long-term needs on the offensive line, particularly at center and tackle, they can still use picks in rounds three, four, and five to identify a future starter while also building depth. Whether you agree with the player or not, the pick of Chandler Zavala was solid in that they were building for depth. The failure occurred when he was forced into action too soon. The stability they have now gives them the flexibility to draft for both the present and the future.

Bottom line is that in a salary cap era, rookies are going to be forced into action.  You hope they are get up to speed quickly or maybe you can mask their inexperience.  It is my hope that the 2025 draft has more of a focus on 2026 and 2027 than it does 2025.

A Quick Fix for the Panthers Defensive issues

Panthers defense in 2022.

David Tepper has received credit for stepping out of the limelight over the past year. However, his decision to push Ron Rivera into adopting the 3-4 defense has proven to be a lasting mistake. Tepper’s infatuation with the Steelers is, at best, strange, and his attempt to replicate their defensive philosophy in Carolina has backfired. This season, the Panthers fielded a historically bad defense. I previously pointed out that the personnel doesn’t fit the scheme.

Longtime fans will recall that during the best seasons in franchise history—2003 and 2015—the defense thrived in a 4-3 system. While some defenders of the organization, particularly former team-employed reporters, may argue that the difference in schemes is minor, the results speak for themselves. Those successful teams relied on controlling the line of scrimmage with two large defensive tackles, a stout left end, and a pass-rushing right end.

This organization’s best defenses have always featured dominant defensive tackles jamming up the middle, controlling the line of scrimmage, and freeing up the linebackers to roam and make plays. It’s time to return to that formula. The Panthers have the personnel to transition back to a 4-3 base defense, which would lead to quick improvements.

Admittedly, this doesn’t align with the current defensive coaching staff’s philosophy, but the odds of this staff, particularly Ejiro Evero, being here in 2026 are slim. Long term, the four-man front is more effective. It allows linebackers to play freely and reduces the likelihood of getting gashed up the middle.

Finally, this team has great pieces in place for the switch, and it would maximize the impact of their best defensive weapon, Derrick Brown.

The shifty route

Adam Thielen.

The Panthers will likely be seeking wide receiver help during the offseason. While Tee Higgins is a name often mentioned, he may be too expensive. Personally, I've never been a fan of spending big money in free agency. It often feels like many players don’t live up to the hype.

Instead, the team could turn to the draft. Tetairoa McMillan (Tet McMillan) is a popular choice at No. 8 in many mock drafts. As someone on the East Coast, I didn’t watch much Arizona football, so I don’t have a fully formed opinion of him. He seems to have the traits of a solid prospect, but I’ve seen concerns about his ability to separate at the line of scrimmage—a skill Steve Smith always emphasized as critical for success.

Another option could be moving back a few spots to draft Luther Burden. While Burden doesn’t have McMillan’s physical size, he appears more NFL-ready and could contribute sooner. That said, rookie wide receivers often need time to develop. Xavier Legette struggled this year despite being a first-round pick, and I’d argue he was more of a second-round talent. It felt like the team panicked with that late Thursday-night selection.

For what it’s worth, I’ve been vocal about wanting Ladd McConkey back in 2024. I followed his career at Georgia closely. His route-running was phenomenal, and his value skyrocketed after his faster-than-expected combine performance.

Right now, the Panthers’ wide receiver corps consists of Adam Thielen, Xavier Legette, and Jalen Coker. While there’s room for improvement, expecting a rookie to come in and save the day is overly optimistic. If the Panthers decide to use the No. 8 pick on a wide receiver, I wouldn’t be upset—it’s a position of need. That said, they could go in many directions at No. 8, and most of them could be justified.

Final Thought
I would not be upset with a first-round wideout. However, if they don’t pull the trigger in Round 1, I implore them to wait until Round 3. Think about all the misses in Round 2—Keary Colbert, Dwayne Jarrett, and more recently Terrace Marshall Jr. and Jonathan Mingo. Maybe it’s not the players or the team, but I don’t want to try that route again.

The Lost Generation

Kansas City Chiefs at Carolina Panthers, 2024. As you can see from the crowd, there is an array of red in the Panthers’ stadium.

The Lost Generation

Building a fanbase for the Carolina Panthers was never going to be easy. By the time 1995 rolled around, Charlotte was still an up-and-coming city brimming with potential. The Charlotte Hornets had already established themselves as a thriving franchise, thanks to stars like Alonzo Mourning, Muggsy Bogues, and, most importantly, Larry Johnson. However, the NBA is an entirely different beast compared to the NFL. Football fandom runs deep, often passed down through generations. This depth of loyalty is evident at every Panthers game, especially in the past seven years, as visiting teams’ fans routinely pack Bank of America Stadium.

When Charlotte was awarded an NFL franchise, the city lacked a native-born population large enough to naturally support the team. Instead, it had to rely heavily on transplants moving to the area. Making matters more challenging, North Carolina was already divided between two deeply entrenched fanbases: the Dallas Cowboys and the Washington Redskins. For the Panthers to succeed, they needed to carve out their own identity in a region dominated by other allegiances.

Adding to the challenge, Charlotte has always been a transplant city, with fans of teams from Buffalo, New York, Philadelphia, and beyond migrating to the area. Winning would have been the key to converting those transplants—and their children—into Panthers fans. But sustained winning has never been a hallmark of this franchise. Carolina has never managed back-to-back winning seasons in its entire history, a failure that continues to haunt the organization.

Unfortunately, the moves made under David Tepper’s ownership have cost the Panthers a generation of fans. My own son, born in North Carolina, is a Ravens fan—unlike me, who grew up in Baltimore. At a young age, kids want to root for a winner, and Carolina hasn’t provided that opportunity. Tepper inherited a franchise already battling for fan loyalty, but instead of building on what was there, his decisions have further alienated the  younger fanbase.

The Panthers were awarded a franchise in part because of Charlotte’s rapid growth and North Carolina’s emergence as one of the fastest-growing states in the nation. That vision works only if the team wins, and wins consistently.

Early on, the Panthers managed some success. They made an NFC Championship appearance in 1996, alongside the Jacksonville Jaguars—an expansion franchise with which they’ll forever be linked. Under Jerry Richardson, despite his reported shortcomings as an owner, the team remained relevant. That relevance has eroded under Tepper’s leadership.

It’s important to recognize that no one likely wants success for the Panthers more than David Tepper. But one could question whether he envisions that success in Charlotte. That’s a conversation for another day. What’s undeniable is that many of his decisions have been disastrous. Tepper comes from a world of hedge funds, which is vastly different from the NFL. While both share the goal of maximizing profits, their structures are nothing alike.

The bottom line is that this organization was always going to face a loyalty problem. Too many people in Charlotte grew up rooting for other teams. Sustained winning could have changed that; but now, the excitement of the magical 2015 season feels like it belongs to a different lifetime.

An ickey dilemma

Ikem Ekwonu for the Panthers.

Since Jordan Gross’s departure nearly a decade ago, the Panthers have struggled to find stability at left tackle. They’ve tried everything: throwing big money at Matt Kalil, experimenting with Byron Bell simply because he was “left-handed,” signing Michael Oher (a.k.a. “The Blind Side” protector), and finally using a top-ten draft pick on the position. When Ikem Ekwonu was drafted, many—including myself—viewed him as a dynamic, Pro Bowl-level left guard. However, the organization had other plans.

They kept Ekwonu at left tackle, the position he played during his junior year at NC State. In that draft, they passed on Evan Neal and Charles Cross. So far, it’s safe to say he’s performed better than Neal, though there’s a legitimate debate between him and Cross.

Ekwonu avoided the infamous “Robert Gallery issue.” Gallery, the surefire pick out of Iowa in 2004, went second overall (ahead of Larry Fitzgerald) and was expected to be the next great left tackle, following in the footsteps of Orlando Pace and Jonathan Ogden. Unfortunately, Gallery’s short arm length allowed defenders to engage him before he could make contact. While he transitioned to guard and had a solid career, he didn’t live up to the expectations of being the second overall pick.

Ekwonu didn’t have this problem. At the NFL Combine, his arm length measured a respectable 34 inches. While he’s slightly shorter than the prototypical left tackle at 6’4”, players like Brad Hopkins (6’3”) thrived at the position for over a decade with the Oilers and Titans.

After Ekwonu’s rookie year, things appeared to be trending upward. It looked like the Panthers had finally stabilized the left tackle position. Yes— he had some struggles, but that was expected. Then came his second season, which was nothing short of a disaster. That’s not unusual—teams now had film on him, and as a wise friend once said, “Year two is always the hardest.”

That brings us to year three and the path forward. This season was an improvement over the previous one, but the question now is what to do as the Panthers head into year four of Ekwonu’s career. With a fifth-year option looming, the decision isn’t difficult, in my opinion. The Panthers should pick up the option, keeping him under team control for at least two more years. During that time, they should work toward a long-term deal.

Let’s be clear: I love the Wolfpacker, but he isn’t worth Trent Williams money. He is, however, worth top-15 to top-20 tackle money, if for no other reason than his versatility. Don’t forget that the longtime stalwart at right tackle currently carries a $31 million cap hit heading into next season. An average left tackle could potentially be an excellent right tackle.

The bottom line is that the Panthers should secure a long-term deal with Ekwonu. With so many holes on defense, the team can’t afford to create another problem by moving on from a serviceable left tackle.  He may not accept what the team offers, but they have to try. 

Bryce Young: Boom or bust?

Bryce Young’s performance in the second half of the season finally gave the organization a reason to exhale. Twenty months after trading a massive haul for the undersized quarterback, the team finally saw a glimpse of the player they envisioned in 2023. Like Kyler Murray and Russell Wilson, Young will always have to contend with his lack of size. However, there’s a noticeable difference—Young doesn’t appear as stout as the other two quarterbacks of similar stature. It’s worth noting that 25 years ago, players like Young might not have been given the same opportunities. The traditional NFL quarterback standard was 6’2”, which eventually dropped to 6’0”(with Drew Brees) and now includes several examples at

5’10’’.

Bryce Young.

Historically, teams have been less concerned with a quarterback’s height than with other challenges shorter players face—specifically, hand size. Since most physical attributes are proportional, shorter quarterbacks often have smaller hands, making it harder to grip frozen footballs in December and January. The same is said with offense tackles. Arm length is a natural attribute sought for playing on the outside and in this case, taller people tend to have longer arms. The reality is that quarterbacks have always been shorter than their offensive linemen. For instance, Jonathan Ogden (6’9”) and Orlando Pace (6’8”) towered over quarterbacks like Trent Dilfer and Kurt Warner, who were both listed around 6’1” to 6’2”. Similarly, Bryce Young isn’t seeing over his linemen, like Ikem Ekwonu or Taylor Moton—he’s throwing through passing lanes in the pocket or rolling outside.

Dan Morgan’s key moves last year have proven critical to Bryce’s development. At the time, signing Robert Hunt and Damien Lewis seemed like overpayments—perhaps a result of the “bad team tax” or panic buying. In hindsight, however, those investments look like brilliant decisions. Combined with Taylor Moton’s consistent performance and Ikem Ekwonu’s improvement, they created a cleaner pocket for Young, preventing him from being forced to “throw from a well.”

Still, there’s work to be done. In my opinion, the team missed an opportunity in last year’s draft by failing to address the center position. There were excellent options available in the second round. While Jonathan Brooks has potential, the team could have drafted the next Ryan Kalil. Players like Jackson Powers-Johnson or Zach Frazier could have solidified the position for a decade, stepping into an ideal situation between two veteran guards.

A similar scenario played out in 2007 when the Panthers signed Justin Hartwig in free agency. Hartwig was a solid addition, along with other key signings like Ma’ake Kemoeatu and Ken Lucas. However, when the draft arrived, the Panthers made the smart decision to select Ryan Kalil, who went on to anchor the offensive line for 12 years. In contrast, the 2024 Panthers selected a running back—a devalued position—coming off an ACL injury. That choice will likely cost them two of the four years of his rookie contract.

In hindsight, the organization, and specifically the owner, overestimated Young’s ability to carry an offense. It was a mistake to label Bryce as a “point guard” who could distribute the ball effectively with lesser talent surrounding him. They gave up a lot to acquire Bryce, expecting him to immediately resemble the player he was at Alabama, without realizing he didn’t have the same level of talent around him in the NFL, nor did he have the raw physical ability or size of Cam Newton.

This brings me to a larger point about evaluating quarterbacks. Player evaluation is one of the most challenging aspects of the game. In 1998, there was significant debate over the top pick in the draft. While the Colts ultimately selected Peyton Manning, some questioned whether Ryan Leaf was the better prospect. Similarly, the 2011 draft had its own quarterback drama. Although many in Charlotte’s media assumed Cam Newton was the pick, some national mock drafts projected Blaine Gabbert going No. 1 overall.

The 2023 draft came down to Bryce Young and C.J. Stroud, with reports of a split between some combination of ownership, front office and the coaching staff. Both quarterbacks had the advantage of playing with superior talent in college. Alabama and Ohio State have consistently produced NFL-caliber receivers, giving Young and Stroud an edge that made it harder for scouts to evaluate how they’d perform in the NFL, where the playing field is more level.

Contrast that with quarterbacks like Patrick Mahomes, Josh Allen, Lamar Jackson, Jared Goff, or Brock Purdy—all of whom played at programs that weren’t national powerhouses but elevated the talent around them. This raises an important question: Should NFL teams focus more on quarterbacks who have demonstrated the ability to elevate average collegiate teams? Neither Young nor Stroud faced that challenge in college, and some might argue their supporting casts made them look better than they truly were.

As a longtime N.C. State fan, I’ve seen quarterbacks like Philip Rivers, Russell Wilson, Jacoby Brissett, Ryan Finley, and current Ravens backup Devin Leary succeed at varying levels in the NFL. N.C. State is far from a national power, but one thing all those quarterbacks had in common was their ability to elevate the play of those around them. Perhaps NFL teams should place more value on quarterbacks who can lead average college teams to 8 or 9 wins in college, rather than quarterbacks playing with NFL players in college.

Panthers’ Problems: Progress, pitfalls and the path forward

The Carolina Panthers faced numerous issues this season, but by the end of the year, the most glaring problem was their league-worst defense. While the scheme may have played a role in their inability to stop opposing offenses, the personnel certainly didn’t help.

The traditional 3-4 defense has historically relied on a base of larger, more physical players in the front seven. Think of past Steelers teams or the Patriots of the 2010s. Three down linemen, with ends weighing 310-320 pounds, and a nose tackle like Casey Hampton or Vince Wilfork anchoring the middle, were staples of this system. The nose tackle commanded constant double teams, while ends like Richard Seymour were capable of doing the same.

Now, fast forward to the Panthers in 2024. They featured a nose tackle weighing just 305 pounds and two defensive ends who didn’t crack the 300-pound threshold. Defensive coordinator Ejiro Evero opted for a modified version of the 3-4, favoring lighter yet longer players up front. However, the results of this plan landed him on the hot seat by season’s end. The team could point to Derrick Brown’s injury as a contrubuting factor, but the reality is that continuing to use "4-3" players in a 3-4 scheme will lead to the same disappointing results.

The Panthers need to get bigger up front—not just with the three down linemen, but also on the edge and at linebacker. When the Ravens transitioned from their historically dominant 4-3 defense to a 3-4, even Ray Lewis had to add 15-20 pounds to thrive in this system. Right now, the Panthers must prioritize finding a true nose tackle in the mold of Casey Hampton to anchor the middle. Derrick Brown can solidify one defensive end spot, and A'Shawn Robinson could serve as a temporary fix for the other.

At linebacker, Trevin Wallace has solid potential, and Josey Jewell is a proven veteran, but their size does not meet the NFL standard for this scheme. A lack of size in the middle of the linebacker corps can be offset by a larger nose tackle. Ideally, these spots should be manned by bigger, more physical linebackers who can take on guards and shed blocks; ie, James Farrior in Pittsburgh's defense.

The Panthers obviously need immediate help across the defense. Players like Abdul Carter, Mason Graham, Jalon Walker, and Mykel Williams have all been mocked (mock drafted) to them, and all of these players would have roles in this system. However, it’s equally important for the Panthers to hit on players in the mid-rounds—something they have struggled with in recent years. Mid-round picks can serve as depth players in their rookie seasons but must be developed into future replacements for veterans like Jewell and Robinson.

Finding Trait Players in the Later Rounds

One of the biggest lessons successful teams teach is the importance of finding "trait players" in the later rounds of the draft. These are players who may not be complete prospects but possess one standout quality that fits a specific need. For the Panthers, that could mean targeting size in the defensive front and linebacker, and length in the secondary.

Hitting on these kinds of players is critical for depth and long-term development. The Panthers must hit on the 8th pick, but they have to start to build a pipeline of players who can step in when injuries occur or veterans age out of their roles.

The bottom line is this: even though many fans might prefer a return to the 4-3 defense, that change is unlikely under owner David Tepper, who mandated the switch to the 3-4. For the Panthers to improve, they must bring in players whose physical traits match the demands of the scheme. Yes, they need pass rushers, defensive tackles, linebackers, safeties, and corners—but more importantly, they need players who are the right fit to succeed within this system.